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"There simply does not exist a method of moral philoso-
phy,"] John Hart Ely tells us in a three-page rejoinder to all moral 
philosophers, past, present, and future. Push back each philoso-
pher's analysis far enough, he argues, and each is seen to have 
made an initial value choice no better or worse than the others. 
"When we search for an external source of values with which to 
fill in the Constitution's open texture," he writes, "we search in 
vain."2 
There is, of course, some truth to the point: syllogisms can't 
always come from other syllogisms because ultimate major prem-
ises don't come from epistomological storks. But it's an objection 
from which Ely himself doesn't escape. .Democracy and .Distrust 
relies in the end upon the manifest good of representation rein-
forcement. Clearing the channels of political change and cor-
recting systemic malfunctions may ultimately be terrific things for 
courts to do, but we shouldn't deceive ourselves into believing that 
process is never a value choice. It can be, and for Ely it is. To 
paraphrase his response to Alexander Bickel, that's what he prom-
ised he wouldn't do to us; "the fact that it's done with mirrors 
shouldn't count as a defense. "3 
All of which leads to the point of this essay: he shouldn't have 
promised us that, because it just might not be true that we search 
in vain. Neither Rawls nor Nozick has the answer, Ely suggests, 
because they "reach very different conclusions" and, in the case of 
Rawls, "almost all the commentators on [his] work have expressed 
reservations about his conclusions."4 
Well, there could be a little more going on here. Maybe one 
of them is right and the critics are just plain wrong. Ely's line 
from Philip Roth, applied by him to naturallaw-"Then the other 
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fellow is wrong, idiot!"s-applies here as well: funny or not, it 
may nonetheless be true that the other fellow is wrong; and the 
mere fact that the other fellow disagrees does not, in any event, 
mean that you're wrong. It's just too facile to dismiss the work of 
Rawls or Nozick or whomever because his writing has not been 
universally hailed as a harbinger of the millenium. Democracy 
may be a great idea, but you can't decide whether a particular 
moral philosophy is "fine"6 (to use Ely's word) through the use of 
public opinion. 
It's especially necessary to get down into the trenches and re-
spond substantively where the rejected moral philosophy is one 
that claims ineluctability-one that purports to follow inescapably 
from universally accepted intuitive premises. Perhaps the para-
digm of such approaches is Immanuel Kant's categorical impera-
tive: Act according to a maxim which can be adopted at the same 
time as a universal law of human conduct.7 One must, in other 
words, apply the same rule to another's act that one applies to 
one's own act. A person unwilling to do so effectively acknowl-
edges that his own behavior is impermissible by refusing to posit 
the moral principle necessary to legitimize his own conduct. Ly-
ing is thus impermissible in that one would not wish all others to 
lie.s The actions of collective entities are arguably subject to the 
same precept: the impermissibility of shooting down an unarmed 
civilian aircraft that has strayed over one's territory is demon-
strated by a nation's presumed unwillingness to allow its own ci-
vilian aircraft to be shot down. 
This notion of "neutral principles" is of course not foreign to 
constitutional jurisprudence.9 Indeed, variants of the idea perme-
ate theories of collective order. The principle that like cases 
should be decided alike is at the heart of the mandate of equal 
protection of the laws. The whole doctrine of stare decisis may in 
the end represent little more than the same consideration. 
The theory of the categorical imperative has, it is true, gener-
ated volumes of criticism. One obvious difficulty lies in character-
izing the "act" in question. Is the act a "lie" or a statement made, 
say, under duress to save a settlement from attack? Any act can 
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be generalized or particularized almost infinitely so as to include 
or exclude almost any attendant circumstances, and the breadth of 
the "maxim" that derives from universalizing the act will vary ac-
cordingly. Neither Kant nor anyone else has told us how to de-
cide what facts go into a proper formulation of any given act. 
Although the objection is sound, it applies to far more than 
simply Kant's categorical imperative. The concept of a "holding" 
no broader than the "facts" of a case, for example, raises precisely 
the same problem, as any lawyer who has ever written a brief can 
testify. The objection may ultimately go to limitations inherent in 
human conceptualization: moral precepts-rules intended to 
guide human conduct-are, after all, constructs of the mind, not 
scientific discoveries. Many of the objections leveled against intu-
itionist theories such as Kant's are, in reality, objections to 
processes of inference and syllogistic reasoning that comprise not 
only the methodology of law, but the life of the mind. 
Less persuasive is the objection that the categorical impera-
tive is without substance. Ely may be too quick in concluding that 
the neutral principles notion "does not . . . tell us anything useful 
about the appropriate content of those principles."w Arguably, 
the seminal moral act is the very act of formulating maxims of 
conduct under the guidance of the imperative ("lying is impermis-
sible," "murder is impermissible," etc.). Applying the categorical 
imperative to the very act of formulating maxims may preclude 
the adoption of any maxim which would vitiate the process by 
which others formulate their own maxims. 
Viewed thus, the imperative is anything but content-neutral. 
Kant's belief that each person must be treated as an end rather 
than a means 11-that human autonomy is implied by the categori-
cal imperative-then becomes more understandable. A Charles 
Manson who professes to prefer a world of mass killers is there-
fore not adhering to the imperative, because the act of killing 
eliminates the victim's ability to undertake the act of choice that 
the imperative demands as a part of formulating a maxim. The 
consequences of the maxim "killing is permissible" are, in other 
words, incompatible with the antecedent condition of volition 
upon which the possibility of adopting that maxim (or any 
maxim) depends. 
The methodology suggested by John Rawls provides a con-
ceptual paraphrase of Kant.I2 To shape a just society, detach 
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II. See I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 12-13 (W. Hastie trans. 1974). 
12. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
232 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:229 
yourself mentally from your position in your own and assume the 
"original position" in which no one yet has any position-eco-
nomic, social, political, or even physical or psychological. Behind 
a "veil of ignorance''-not knowing in which position you might 
ultimately find yourself~esign all societal positions, as well as 
the governing law. The process of so designing a society is akin to 
the process of formulating maxims of conduct under the categori-
cal imperative. In the "original position," assuming equal odds of 
ending up in any of the positions you design, you might not make 
all positions equally attractive so as to build in systems of incen-
tive. Nonetheless you would infuse each with the highest possible 
measure of autonomy. Why? Because you don't know what char-
acteristics and preferences you'll end up with, and you would 
want to make it as easy as possible to be "fulfilled" in whatever 
position you ultimately occupy. 
To the person who claims to prefer a society that minimizes 
autonomy, the response is that he or she cannot assume that that 
same preference would exist in the new, randomly assigned posi-
tion. The only means of assuring fulfillment on the part of an 
authoritarian personality is, paradoxically, to provide that person 
sufficient autonomy to vitiate unwanted autonomy. Persons filling 
societal positions created behind a "veil of ignorance" would thus 
be granted the same wide latitude of personal choice required by 
the categorical imperative--choice with regard to all matters not 
impinging upon the right of others to choose. 
The conclusion curiously parallels the utilitarian argument of 
John Stuart Mill that the only proper role of the state is to prevent 
one person from harming another.D Indeed, under Rawls's the-
ory it would also seem unreasonable to agree in the "original posi-
tion" to rules restricting harmless conduct, because you might end 
up in the position of wanting to engage in that conduct. Con-
versely, you would readily agree to rules governing every new po-
sition which would prohibit persons assigned to those positions 
from harming others. 
The result is a state in which people are let alone to pursue 
their own ends except when those ends involve harm to others. 
This reasoning may support Justice Brandeis's claim that the 
"right to be let alone" is the right "most valued by civilized 
men."I4 This right to be let alone is at the core of all theories of 
personal autonomy. 
For reasons such as these, a right of personal autonomy of the 
13. See]. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
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sort recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut Is might properly be re-
garded as fundamental-perhaps, indeed, the most fundamental 
of rights. The Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptive devices impinged profoundly on the right to be let alone 
by ruling out the choice to use birth control devices while ex-
panding choice on the part of no one. The New York statute in-
validated by the Court in Lochner v. New York 16 was, one might 
argue, valid for precisely the same reason: it enhanced the ability 
of New York bakery employees to be let alone by freeing them 
from economic coercion. Prior to the enactment of the statute 
their personal autonomy was undermined by a vast economic dis-
parity in bargaining positions which reduced unacceptably the 
breadth of life-choices of which autonomy is comprised. (It is, I 
think, a frivolous objection to claim that the "personal autonomy" 
of the bakery owners was violated by denying them the opportu-
nity to force workers to work more than 60 hours per week; 
among other things, the breadth of their life-choices would have 
remained essentially undiminished.) When On Liberty was writ-
ten, the greatest threat to personal autonomy was posed by big 
government; big business as we know it today did not yet exist. 
After the industrial revolution, however, in an era of mega-busi-
nesses whose annual revenues rival most of the countries on the 
globe, governmental interposition is not only appropriate but nec-
essary to redress the imbalance of power and to protect personal 
autonomy. 
This is the wisdom, albeit unarticulated, of Nebbia v. New 
York.I 7 Preservation of the right to be let alone-a right that sub-
sists in choice-examination-is, in the end, the state's objective in 
much "social welfare" legislation, and it is entirely proper that the 
Supreme Court be solicitous of that objective by deferring, as it 
has, to the legislative will through use of the "rational basis" test. 
For the reasons stated, however, the Court arguably ought not de-
fer to the legislative judgment embodied in a statute of the sort 
hypothesized by Harry Wellington-"a statute making it a crime 
for any person to remove another person's gall bladder, except to 
save that person's life." Is It is not enough to say, as Ely does, that 
such a law simply couldn't be enacted. In Millian terms, the func-
tional equivalent was enacted by the people of Connecticut, and a 
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
17. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
18. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some 
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 304-05 (1973), quoted in J. ELY, supra note I, at 
182. 
234 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:229 
number of other states as well-~me need simply scan the list of 
"right to privacy" cases to see that Ely's improbabilities have cap-
tured the fancy of state legislator after state legislator, not to men-
tion city councils and school boards. Ely's theory of participation 
reinforcement is thus not simply under-protective of personal au-
tonomy; it ignores personal autonomy completely as a constitu-
tionally legitimate value because it is not process-related. 
This is a serious, and I think fatal, shortcoming in his theory. 
The intuitionist case for personal autonomy, summarily outlined 
above, is not without flaws, the most prominent being a measure 
of circularity. But it is not so patently specious as to be dis-
missable on the theory that the Constitution can't "keep up with 
the New York Review of Books,"I9 much less because "almost all 
the commentators on" someone's work have "expressed reserva-
tions about his conclusions."2o Personal autonomy is one legal-
political value-perhaps the only one-that arguably traces di-
rectly to intuitive sources. It is also the value most threatened by a 
high-technology, corporation-dominated society. Strict scrutiny 
of statutes impinging on the right to be let alone is needed if that 
right is to survive. 
19. J. ELY, supra note I, at 58. 
20. ld. (referring to Rawls). 
